| Harsanyi, John C. (1920-2000) |
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My parents owned
a pharmacy in Budapest, which gave us a comfortable living. As I was their
only child, they wanted me to become a pharmacist. But my own preference
would have been to study philosophy and mathematics. Yet, in 1937 when
I actually had to decide my field of study, I chose pharmacy in accordance
with my parents' wishes. I did so because Hitler was in power in Germany,
and his influence was steadily increasing also in Hungary. I knew that
as a pharmacy student I would obtain military deferment. As I was of Jewish
origin, this meant that I would not have to serve in a forced labor unit
of the Hungarian army. In that November the Nazi authorities finally decided to deport my labor unit from Budapest to an Austrian concentration camp, where most of my comrades eventually perished. But I was lucky enough to make my escape from the railway station in Budapest, just before our train left for Austria. Then a Jesuit father I had known gave me refuge in the cellar of their monastery. In 1946 I re-enrolled at the University of Budapest in order to obtain a Ph.D. in philosophy with minors in sociology and in psychology. As I got credit for my prior studies in pharmacy, I did get my Ph.D. in June 1947, after only one more year of course work and after writing a dissertation in philosophy. From September 1947
to June 1948 I served as a junior faculty member at the University Institute
of Sociology. There I met Anne Klauber, a psychology student who attended
a course I was teaching and who later became my wife. But in June 1948,
I had to resign from the Institute because the political situation no
longer permitted them to employ an outspoken anti-Marxist as I had been. Actually we did so only in April 1950. We had to cross the Hungarian border illegally over a marshy terrain, which was less well guarded than other border areas. But even so, we were very lucky not to be stopped or shot at by the Hungarian border guards. After waiting in Austria for our Australian landing permits for several months, we actually reached Sydney, Australia, on December 30, 1950. On January 2, 1951, Anne and I got married. Her unfailing emotional support and her practical good sense have always been a great help to me. As my English was
not very good and as my Hungarian university degrees were not recognized
in Australia, during most of our first three years there I had to do factory
work. But in the evening I took economics courses at the University of
Sydney. (I changed over from sociology to economics because I found the
conceptual and mathematical elegance of economic theory very attractive.)
I was given some credit for my Hungarian university courses so that I
had to do only two years of further course work and had to write an M.A.
thesis in economics in order to get an M.A. I did receive the degree late
in 1953. In 1958 Anne and
I returned to Australia, where I got a very attractive research position
at the Australian National University in Canberra. But soon I felt very
isolated because at that time game theory was virtually unknown in Australia.
I turned to Ken Arrow for help. With his and Jim Tobin's help, I was appointed
Professor of Economics at Wayne State University in Detroit. Then, in
1964, I became at first Visiting Professor and then Professor at the Business
School of the University of California in Berkeley. Later my appointment
was extended also to the Department of Economics. Our only child Tom was
born in Berkeley. My interest in game-theoretic problems in a narrower sense was first aroused by John Nash's four brilliant papers, published in the period 1950-53, on cooperative and on noncooperative games, on two-person bargaining games and on mutually optimal threat strategies in such games, and on what we now call Nash equilibria. In 1956 I showed the mathematical equivalence of Zeuthen's and of Nash's bargaining models and stated algebraic criteria for optimal threat strategies. In 1963 I extended the Shapely value to games without transferable utility and showed that my new solution concept was a generalization both of the Shapley value and of Nash's bargaining solution with variable threats. In a three-part paper
published in 1967 and 1968, I showed how to convert a game with incomplete
information into one with complete yet imperfect information, so as to
make it acessible to game-theoretic analysis. I also published a number of papers on utilitarian ethics. I published four books. One of them, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (1977), was an attempt to unify game theory by extending the use of bargaining models from cooperative games also to noncooperative games. Two books, Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation (1976), and Papers in Game Theory (1982), were collections of some of my journal articles. Finally, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988) was a joint work with Reinhard Selten. Its title indicates its content. Let me add that in
1993 and 1994 I wrote two, as yet unpublished papers, proposing a new
theory of equilibrium selection. My 1993 paper does so for games with
complete information, while my 1994 paper does so for games with incomplete
information. My new theory is based on our 1988 theory but is a much simpler
theory and is in my view an intuitively more attractive one. From Les Prix Nobel 1994. Addendum: John C. Harsanyi died in 2000. |