Nicaragua

Pre-Columbian and Colonial Periods At the end of the 15th century, western Nicaragua was inhabited by several indigenous peoples related by culture and language to those of Central Mexico. They were primarily farmers who lived in towns, organized into small kingdoms. In eastern Nicaragua, a much smaller group of Native Americans who had migrated from Colombia and Panama lived a less sedentary life based on hunting and gathering. The explorer Christopher Columbus sighted Nicaragua in 1502, but the first Spanish expedition, headed by Gil González Dávila, didn't arrive until 20 years later. The conquest he began was completed from 1523 to 1524 by Francisco Fernández de Córdoba, who founded the cities of Granada and León. The conquest proved disastrous for the native population. Many died from diseases carried to the region by Europeans, such as measles, to which they had no immunity. Many of the survivors were enslaved; an estimated 200,000 were shipped off to labor in the mines of Peru and other parts of Spain's empire. Of an estimated 1 million indigenous people before the conquest, a 1548 census found only 11,137 Native Americans left in western Nicaragua. For most of the colonial period Nicaragua was part of the Captaincy General, or Kingdom, of Guatemala. The kingdom was largely autonomous, but was technically part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, the huge Spanish territory based in Mexico. Far from the regional center in Guatemala, Nicaragua became a colonial backwater that exported small amounts of indigo and cacao. Its potential as a transit route between the Pacific and Atlantic brought some trade, but also attracted the attention of English buccaneers such as Sir Richard Hawkins, who plundered Nicaragua and other Spanish colonies in the 1590s. The British began to extend their influence over the inhabitants of Nicaragua's Caribbean coast as early as 1633. In 1655 a British expedition sacked Granada, and 30 years later another looted Granada and León. The failure of a military expedition in 1780 ended British efforts to expand into western Nicaragua, but they retained control over the Miskito native peoples along the Caribbean coast, even creating a puppet Mosquitia Kingdom in 1687. British influence did not end until 1893. In the mid-18th century Spain introduced commercial reforms into its American colonies. In an effort to expand trade, it allowed colonies to trade more freely with Spanish ports and each other, which promoted production of export crops. These policies, combined with a growing desire among colonists to control their own affairs, divided upper-class Nicaraguans into two factions: those favoring such reforms, including merchants centered around León and known as Liberals, and those opposed, called Conservatives, who were concentrated near Granada and included large landowners. This rivalry would be a dominant element of Nicaraguan politics well into the 20th century. Independence and the 19th Century Independence came slowly to Nicaragua, as movements to break away from Spanish rule arose in many colonies in the early 1800s. An 1811 uprising was crushed by colonial officials, and only when Spanish authority collapsed in Mexico in 1821 did Nicaragua, along with most of Central America, break with Spain. After the region declared independence, it was briefly part of the Mexican Empire of Agustín de Iturbide, but when he fell in 1823, Nicaragua and four other states formed a federation, the United Provinces of Central America. This effort to unite the region was doomed by conflicts between Liberals and Conservatives and by rivalries among the member states. Liberals and Conservatives advocated different political, economic, and religious policies. Liberals promoted free-market capitalism, a strong central government, and limited power for the Catholic clergy, while Conservatives favored the traditional economic and social structure, dominated by large landowners and the church. Facing these divisions, the federation began to break apart in 1838, when Nicaragua, along with several other members, seceded and became independent states. In the 1840s and 1850s, Nicaragua was dominated by rivalries between León's Liberals and Granada's Conservatives and by a struggle between the United States and Great Britain for influence over the transit route across Nicaragua. The discovery of gold in California motivated U.S. investors, led by the wealthy industrialist Cornelius Vanderbilt, to create the Accessory Transit Company to transport U.S. citizens across Nicaragua. The company's network of carriages and boats took passengers from the Caribbean to the Pacific, by way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. By 1852 a third of those traveling to California by sea used this route. To protect U.S. interests, the administration of President James Polk negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, in which both nations agreed not to take control over the transit routes across Nicaragua. This marked the end of U.S.-British rivalry over Nicaragua and the beginning of U.S. dominance. Meanwhile, Conservative-Liberal rivalry had broken out into open civil war. The Conservatives were winning, so the Liberals asked an American, William Walker, to recruit a private army to aid them (see Filibustering Expeditions). Known as filibusters, Walker's troops began arriving in 1855 and soon took control of the country, shoving aside leaders of both parties and installing Walker as president. This alarmed the rest of Central America. With support from the British and Vanderbilt, whose business interests Walker had opposed, the other countries in the region formed an army to drive Walker out, defeating him in 1857. Walker's fall brought the Conservatives back to power. Under their rule, which lasted until 1893, the capital was moved to Managua in an effort to dampen the rivalry between Granada and León. Coffee became the dominant export crop, and railroad construction was begun. United States interest in a possible canal grew slowly, but an 1884 treaty giving the U.S. exclusive canal rights was never ratified by the U.S. Senate. In 1893 a Liberal general, José Santos Zelaya, seized power. He continued as president until 1909, putting down Conservative revolts and making Nicaragua a major player in Central America's power struggles. He tried to improve public administration and develop the economy, promoting the beginning of banana exports. Railroads and ports were improved, schools were expanded, and the military was modernized. An agreement with the British led to their final withdrawal from the Caribbean coast. But hopes that the United States would build a canal were dashed when the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt selected a route through Panama instead (see Panama Canal). Relations deteriorated, and U.S. officials became convinced that Zelaya was an unstable element in the region who should be replaced. The Intervention Era, 1909-1933 In 1909 the United States encouraged a revolt against Zelaya, then used naval forces to prevent him from crushing the uprising. Zelaya resigned, but U.S. pressures continued until his successor turned over power to a coalition government. This proved unstable, and in 1913 U.S. Marines landed and imposed order, defeating a Liberal force and ensuring that Conservative Adolfo Díaz remained president. A small Marine unit stayed in Nicaragua until 1925, making it clear that revolutions would not be tolerated. This enabled the Conservatives, a minority party, to rig elections without fear of being overthrown. Allied with the Conservatives, U.S. interests soon dominated Nicaragua. Conservative leader General Emiliano Chamorro signed the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, which gave the United States exclusive rights to build a canal across Nicaragua in exchange for $3 million, and became president in 1916. The United States never planned to build a canal, but wanted the treaty to ensure that no other nation would be able to do so. For Nicaraguan nationalists, this became a symbol of U.S. exploitation of Nicaragua. United States officials and businesses also came to dominate much of Nicaragua's economy and banking system. In the early 1920s the United States sought to promote political stability in the country so that the Marines would not be needed to prevent revolts. The United States tried to create a professional Nicaraguan military that could maintain order and to reform corrupt election practices. After elections brought a weak Liberal-Conservative coalition to power in 1925, the Marines left. But civil war immediately erupted, as Chamorro, the defeated Conservative candidate, ousted the Liberals from government and took over the presidency himself. This created a conflict for the United States: It feared that the Liberals might win the war, especially when they seemed to be getting support from a revolutionary government in Mexico. But the United States also wanted a stable government in Nicaragua and to prevent coups, such as Chamorro's. Therefore U.S. officials worked to force Chamorro from power, and former president Díaz again took office. But the Liberals continued to win the civil conflict, and in 1927 the United States again landed several thousand Marines in Nicaragua to support the Conservative government. Former U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson then negotiated a peace agreement, under which Liberals were given some government posts, the United States agreed to supervise the 1928 elections, and troops of both sides were disarmed. They were to be replaced by a new, U.S.-created and -trained force that combined police and military, the National Guard. One Liberal general, Augusto César Sandino, refused to accept this agreement. He formed a rebel army and carried on a guerrilla campaign against the U.S. presence until 1933. This made him symbol of nationalism to many Nicaraguans and others who opposed U.S. intervention. In 1928 U.S.-supervised elections brought Liberal General José María Moncada to power. Because of concerns about Sandino and the time needed to train the National Guard, the Marines remained in Nicaragua until January 1933. Plans to improve the economy fell victim to the worldwide depression of the 1930s and to a massive earthquake that destroyed Managua in 1931. The U.S. again supervised the 1932 presidential elections, which were won by Liberal leader Juan Bautista Sacasa. The Marines then withdrew, giving command of the National Guard to a Liberal politician, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who was married to Sacasa's niece. Sandino quickly negotiated a truce with the Sacasa government, ending his rebellion. But tensions between the National Guard and Sandino mounted steadily, and in 1934 Sandino was murdered by Guard officers. He became a hero to many Nicaraguans, and his name would be adopted more than 40 years later by revolutionaries trying to overthrow the government and change Nicaraguan society, the Sandinistas. The Somoza Dynasty, 1936-1979 With Sandino out of the way, Somoza began his climb to power. In 1936 he forced Sacasa to resign, pressured the Liberal Party into making him their presidential nominee, then used the National Guard to ensure his victory. Once in office he used corruption and favoritism to cement his control over Guard officers, and political favors to keep the Liberal Party in line behind him. He took whatever steps he could to maintain the image of U.S. support, making an official visit to Washington, D.C., in 1939, naming Managua's main street after President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and declaring Roosevelt's birthday a national holiday. He also began to amass the largest private fortune in Nicaraguan history. With military support, wealth, and U.S. backing, he and his family members would rule Nicaragua for the next 43 years. In the 1940s the United States began pressuring Somoza not to run for reelection. He reluctantly agreed, believing that as National Guard commander he could control any elected president. His forces ensured that his hand-picked successor won the 1947 election, but once in office the new president tried to replace Somoza as Guard commander. He was promptly overthrown, and a series of puppet presidents completed his term. Somoza then negotiated a deal with the Conservatives, still led by General Chamorro, which allowed him to win the presidency in 1950. Somoza continued to cultivate U.S. support, and to that end he backed the 1954 coup that toppled a reformist government in Guatemala. The coup had also been supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He planned to run again in 1957 but was assassinated in 1956. As president, Somoza gave Nicaragua peace and stability. The economy grew, new exports such as cotton were developed, and the foreign debt was paid. But all of this came at a high price. Corruption was institutionalized; force, fraud, and inside deals dominated politics, and the country was run as a giant estate for the benefit of the Somoza family. When members of elite families rebelled against Somoza's rule they were exiled, but those without such influence were often imprisoned, tortured, or killed. Somoza had groomed his sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle, to succeed him. After their father's assassination, Luis became president and Anastasio, known as Tachito, took over command of the National Guard. They continued their father's system of control and corruption, and maintained support for U.S. policies. In 1961 they allowed Nicaragua to be used as the launching pad for the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, which had been led by Cuban exiles and backed by the CIA. Nicaragua's role in the invasion created hatred between revolutionary Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the Somozas. That year, a small group of Nicaraguans organized an armed guerrilla force to try to overthrow the Somozas. Taking their name from General Sandino, they called themselves Sandinistas and their movement the Sandinista National Liberation Front (known by its Spanish abbreviation FSLN). The FSLN's founders-Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga-were Marxists who had met as university students involved in anti-Somoza activities. They were inspired by the Cuban revolution and supported by Castro. Beginning with only about 20 members, the Sandinistas slowly won support during the 1960s among rural Nicaraguans, students, and poor urban youth. The Somozas continued to hold power but allowed an associate they controlled to be elected president in 1963. However, Anastasio Somoza was determined to have his turn as president in 1967. When Luis died that year, the only effective limit on Anastasio's ambition was removed. As president, Anastasio Somoza Debayle proved to be more corrupt, but less capable than his father. While the Somoza family and its close associates amassed even greater wealth, the poorest Nicaraguans grew poorer, especially in rural areas. By the 1970s, the top 5 percent of the population received 30 percent of the nation's income, while the poorest 50 percent received only 15 percent. Malnutrition and disease were widespread among the poor. Growing resentment over these conditions caused many young Nicaraguans, especially students, to join the Sandinistas. However, the guerrillas suffered repeated defeats in clashes with the National Guard. After a military campaign failed in 1967, many of the Sandinistas' leaders were killed, jailed, or exiled, but the group rebuilt during the early 1970s. The Somoza dynasty began to unravel in the mid-1970s. In December 1972, Managua was again destroyed by an earthquake that killed as many as 10,000 people and left as many as 300,000 homeless. Millions of dollars in international aid poured into Nicaragua, but Somoza and the Guard took most of it for their own benefit. This corruption angered most Nicaraguans, including middle-class and business people. Somoza's manipulation of politics became even more brazen when he was again elected president in 1974. Those who opposed Somoza were often imprisoned, tortured, exiled, or killed, and the Guard murdered and terrorized rural residents in areas of guerrilla activity. Constitutional rights were suspended and the press was censored. Yet opposition to the regime increased. The Sandinistas gained support among rural and urban residents for their guerrilla campaign. In addition, prominent Nicaraguans formed an anti-Somoza political movement, and Managua's archbishop, Miguel Obando y Bravo, became the spokesman for the Catholic Church's growing opposition to the Somozas. The dictatorship also faced economic and international problems. The economy had grown rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, but that ended in the mid-1970s due to the increasing costs of the Somoza regime's corruption and the rise in world prices for oil, which Nicaragua depended on for electric power and agricultural chemicals. U.S. support declined after 1977 when Jimmy Carter became president and began to emphasize human rights and democracy in relations with Latin America. Somoza survived a 1977 heart attack, but this raised further doubts about the regime's ability to maintain control. The Sandinista Revolution, 1978-1990 The conflict between the Somoza regime and the Nicaraguan people reached a crisis point in January 1978. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a prominent newspaper editor and leader of the political opposition to Somoza, was murdered, probably by business associates of the president. This set off rioting and a nationwide general strike to demand that Somoza resign. In August 1978 a Sandinista commando force, headed by Edén Pastora (known as Comandante Zero), seized the National Palace and took the Nicaraguan congress hostage. A negotiated solution was reached, but the incident shattered the image of the Guard as invincible and gave the Sandinistas worldwide prestige. Within Nicaragua the Sandinista victory sparked a series of uprisings. The Guard responded with great brutality, killing many civilians. As a result, recruits flocked to the Sandinistas, and the business class supported another nationwide strike. The United States and other nations began seeking ways to force Somoza out of office, but an international mediation effort collapsed at the end of 1978. Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Panama now joined Cuba in supporting the Sandinistas, and many Nicaraguan business leaders and politicians decided that, despite the Marxist orientation of the Sandinistas, they were preferable to Somoza and the only alternative. In May 1979 the Sandinistas launched an all-out offensive to overthrow Somoza, calling for a popular uprising. The Organization of American States rejected a U.S. proposal to send an international armed force to Nicaragua to restore peace. Instead, the OAS called on Somoza to resign and turn over power to a Junta (Council) of National Reconstruction, selected by the Sandinistas. Somoza fled into exile, the National Guard dissolved, and on July 19, 1979, the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua. An estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Nicaraguans had died in the war to defeat Somoza. The Sandinistas set up the junta and a broad-based cabinet, including non-Sandinistas, to govern and rebuild the war-damaged nation. Their goals included ambitious health care, literacy, and land-reform programs to help the poor. A council of representatives from business, labor, and other segments of society was established to act as a legislature until elections could be held. But it soon became apparent that real power rested with the Sandinistas' nine-member National Directorate. By 1980 moderate leaders were leaving the government, and tensions between the government and Catholic church officials were growing. Relations with the United States deteriorated steadily, especially after Ronald Reagan became president in 1981. His administration was strongly anti-Communist and was convinced that the Sandinistas were supporting guerrilla forces in other Central American countries and were closely allied with Cuba and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Reagan suspended aid to Nicaragua, imposed an economic boycott, and began supplying money, arms, and training for an armed opposition guerrilla force known as the contras (short for "counterrevolutionaries" in Spanish). These contra forces, based in neighboring countries, included former members of Somoza's National Guard and other Nicaraguans dissatisfied with the new government. Nicaragua, facing contra attacks, began receiving military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The government censored the media, frequently jailed opposition politicians, and increased efforts to impose a socialist model on the economy. Large elements of a private business sector continued, however, and opposition politics were never banned. Elections were held in 1984, but most opposition parties refused to participate. The Sandinista candidate, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, won an easy victory, and the Sandinistas gained a huge majority in the new National Assembly. The United States and much of the opposition resorted to armed force to try to dislodge the Sandinistas. Casualties from the contra war mounted, and the threat of war between Nicaragua and Honduras increased. Honduran officials allowed the contras to attack Nicaragua from bases in their country, built up their own military forces, and permitted the United States to conduct military exercises and build airstrips from which to help the contras. Members of the U.S. Congress who opposed the contra policy tried to restrict funding, but had only limited success until 1986, when the scandal known as the Iran-Contra Affair revealed that Reagan administration officials had violated U.S. law to get support to the contras. Other nations in the hemisphere tried to mediate the Central American crisis. The Contadora group of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama began its efforts in 1983, but had little success. In 1987 Costa Rica's president, Oscar Arias Sánchez, began an effort to have Central America's leaders resolve their own problems. In 1988 the Sandinistas agreed to begin talks with the contras, but fighting continued for several months. Pressures for a negotiated settlement, however, were building. Nicaragua's economy was devastated by the effects of the war and the U.S. embargo, low prices for exports, and a series of natural disasters. Many of the Sandinista government's economic policies, which involved state control of imports and exports, emphasis on agricultural cooperatives, and restrictions on private business, proved unsuccessful. At its worst point, in 1988, Nicaragua had the world's highest annual inflation rate, with estimates ranging from 2000 percent to 36,000 percent. Soviet bloc aid also declined in the late 1980s, as the Soviet economy deteriorated and Communist governments were overthrown in Eastern Europe. At the same time, U.S. efforts to find a negotiated solution in Central America increased with the 1989 inauguration of President George Bush to succeed Reagan. In early 1989 Central America's presidents agreed on a plan for disarming the contras, dispatching a United Nations peacekeeping mission, and holding internationally monitored elections in Nicaragua in early 1990. Confident of victory, the Sandinistas relaxed restrictions on political opponents and allowed a relatively free campaign. Fourteen opposition parties formed the National Opposition Union (UNO) with Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of assassinated editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, as their presidential candidate. Campaigning on a promise to end military conscription and promote national reconciliation, Chamorro won a stunning victory with 55 percent of the vote, defeating incumbent President Ortega, the Sandinista candidate, who received only 41 percent. Nicaragua in the 1990s Chamorro was inaugurated in April 1990 and immediately ended the draft. Restarting the economy proved more difficult. The Sandinistas held the largest bloc of members in the National Assembly, controlled the military and police, and dominated most labor unions. Leading Sandinistas had used the period between the election and the inauguration to appropriate homes and other property for themselves, which became a major source of future controversy. The UNO coalition broke up, in part over a dispute about how to deal with the Sandinistas; the Chamorro administration tried to work with them, while Vice President Virgilio Godoy and the majority of the UNO deputies opposed making concessions to the Sandinistas to gain cooperation. The new government did manage to reform Nicaragua's currency, bringing inflation under 10 percent. But economic recovery was blocked by a number of problems: disputes over property rights, legislative paralysis caused by the breakup of the UNO coalition, Sandinista-backed strikes, and lack of some expected international aid. By the end of 1993 Nicaragua's GDP was slightly below the 1990 level. Most of the contras had put down their arms under UN supervision in 1990, but the lack of jobs, the government's failure to provide promised assistance, and easily available weapons led to rising crime in the cities and renewed violence in rural areas by former contras and soldiers. On the verge of disaster, Nicaraguans began to find ways to work together. The assembly passed a series of constitutional amendments that expanded the power of the legislature and reduced that of the president, and made some provision for dealing with property disputes. A new military code was also adopted, strengthening civilian control over the military and limiting the terms of the commander. After some resistance, Sandinista General Humberto Ortega agreed to step down as military commander. Modest economic growth was achieved in 1994 and 1995. Peaceful elections were held in 1996, with 23 presidential candidates and 32 parties participating. The campaign was often angry, with both major candidates, Managua Mayor Arnoldo Alemán of the right-wing Liberal Alliance and ex-president Ortega of the FSLN, denouncing each other and attacking the Chamorro administration. The election was closely monitored by international observers, who pronounced the voting fair and honest, despite some technical problems. Alemán was elected, and although Ortega and the FSLN challenged the results, they were unable to reverse them. In January 1997, Alemán was inaugurated as president, marking the first time in Nicaraguan history that two consecutive elections had produced a peaceful transfer of power between rival parties.